SEFI Executive Committee Meeting #1

In today’s inaugural meeting we discussed:

  • Lowering Cashback Rewards (Proposal #3)
  • Incentivized Pool Adjustments
  • Secret Swap UX Updates
  • Future Goals and Plans

Lowering Cashback Rewards: Proposal #3

There was ambiguity in the proposal about what lowering to “0.5%” meant, and we had a discussion and took a vote, eventually deciding that it meant to lower the overall percentage of SEFI sent to Cashback from 10% to 0.5% based on this shared table: SEFI Token - SecretSwap. We expect this to be delivered alongside other weight changes and new pools within the next few weeks.

Incentivized Pool Adjustments:

Based on what we have gathered is desired by the community, we took votes and decided to add the following incentivized pairs to Secret Swap:

  • SEFI/sUSDC (eth)
  • sUSDC (eth)/sUSDC (bsc)

We have heard plenty of complaints from the community about lack of SEFI pairings, and hope that this will bring it more need and utility. USDC was chosen over USDT based on internal discussions and deciding to follow recent DEFI trends such as liquidity on Uniswap and Sushiswap. FUD around USDT is plenty, and we hope as we transition to USDC, and eventually UST, we will strengthen the trust in Liquidity Providers.

The weight of these pairings has not yet been determined.

Secret Swap UX Updates:

We will work on organizing the website to more easily differentiate and access the multiple bridges.

Future Goals and Plans:

We briefly discussed possibilities of eventually pursuing CEX and DEX listings for SEFI.

As always I would love feedback and suggestions!


First let me say thank you for posting this summary of the Executive Committee’s efforts. The community hugely benefits from having dedicated people and full transparency and you all are doing a great job!

I think you guys did the right thing interpreting the ambiguous (and poorly written) cashback reduction proposal and your efforts to implement this are super commendable given that not many of us seem to have been in favor (Enigma was opposed if I understand correctly…as was I fwiw).

The pool additions are cause for concern in my opinion. I’d like to make two basic arguments on this front. First, I will argue that initiating these incentives goes beyond the powers, and/or the reasonable use thereof, granted to the Executive Committee (EC) in Proposal1 (P1), from which the EC derives its authority/legitimacy. Second, I will argue that it is not in the interests of secretswap as a platform or its stakeholders (e.g., sefi holders) to incentivize a sefi/sxmr pool, at least at the present time and perhaps ever.

Section 1

The text of P1 outlines the basic reason why a committee is needed:
“Proposals as approved by Governance are text only, and some (if not most) will have actionable clauses. The executive committee is responsible to execute these directives. …and is responsible for making sure the vision of the network is executed.”

Thus, the reason that we need an EC is to execute the will of the community as expressed by governance. Governance on it’s own doesn’t have a means of effectuating its will and the EC solves this.

P1 then formally states:
“The main purposes for this committee are:

  1. Responsibility for executing the proposals approved in governance proposals
  2. Working towards advancing SEFI as a token, SecretSwap as a product and its part in the DeFi ecosystem on Secret Network as a whole”

Purpose 1 is in line with the preamble. Purpose 2 is a bit of a catchall and could be used to argue that the EC has sufficient authority and autonomy to take the actions it has. However, this slope could get quite slippery. The actions of the EC are clearly grounded and legitimate when they are acting in accord with Purpose 1 but almost any action could be argued to be within Purpose 2 according to the opinion of committee members.

Since there is no formal oversight of the EC (other than the 6-month authority sunset that appears at the end of P1), I think it makes more sense to be guided by some limiting principles here. At the very least, if the EC were to vote to do something that had been expressely voted down in formal governance proposals, I think we’d all agree that it would be illegitimate even if the EC members believed it was in the best interests of “advancing SEFI as a token, SecretSwap as a product and its part in the DeFi ecosystem on Secret Network as a whole”.

Purpose 2 must therefore contain some implicit limiting principle at least sufficient to say that the EC can’t directly contravene a passed governance proposal. Now, what about the EC using purpose 2 to effectuate something that the EC members believe is good but that has failed to pass via ordinary governance proposals? I would argue that this is also illegitimate because it is not apparently in line with the will of the community. When the EC believes a given action is good and should be taken pursuant to Purpose 2, then it must consider what if anything is known about the community’s will on the matter. If there is evidence that the action is against the will of the community, then I would argue the EC should not take the action without first passing a governance proposal. A possible exception is extreme time sensitivity combined with extreme impact from inaction.

In light of the above discussion, I’d like to point out that failed governance proposal #5 called for incentivizing “pairs between stablecoins” which arguably describes the sUSDC (eth)/sUSDC (bsc) pool. Similarly, failed governance proposal #6 called for incentivizing a USDC/SEFI pool. Again, both of these failed and now elements of these failed proposals are being unilaterally approved by EC. I would like to emphasize that I’m not against incentivizing either of these pools but the process here is highly questionable.

Later, in the text of P1, the EC is formally granted the following powers:
“The committee will have the following executive powers, which will allow it to make quick decisions, maintain flexibility and implement policy -

  1. Spending of up to 40% of the dev fund on a monthly basis
  2. Modifying up to 20% of the distribution of SEFI rewards”

It is clear that the EC has the power through point 2 to approve the incentives. However, using that power here seems at odds with the intended purpose “to make quick decisions, maintain flexibility and implement policy”. My understanding is that dev work will take a week or so before rewards are ready anyway so why is there a need to make a quick decision here? In what way does implementing parts of failed gov proposals “maintain flexibility”? It sure doesn’t “implement policy” that was approved by governance.

Now, with respect to the SEFI/sXMR pair. Here, I actually do disagree that it is good to incentivize this pair. Before I delve into an argument for why we should instead incentivize sSCRT/sXMR, I’d like to finish this section by clarifying that I think this action also goes beyond the mandate of the EC. Here I want to lean a bit on one of the later parts of P1 where it is declared that:

“The committee will be transparent as possible, except in cases where discretion may be required (for example, if working on a sensitive promotion with another platform).”

Now, it may be argued that this was intended as a toothless filler clause with no specific requirements attached. Note however the sparsity of P1 overall, every sentence should be used to understand the meaning and scope. Note also the sweeping language “transparent as possible”. I would argue that transparency does not merely consist of explaining what actions were taken or what decisions were made, but in a substantive transparency that requires actions be reasonably foreseeable or at least not in contravention to what would be reasonably expected.

That is, I would argue that it’s a violation of transparency to do something completely unexpected (based on past behavior of the platform/committee and a “reasonable person” standard) or in contravention of what would be reasonably expected. The “reasonable expectation” may sound a bit murky but it’s easy to see how this could at least based again on past behavior of the platform/committee and possibly even analogous situations or platforms. This is very similar to “Rule-of-Law” in that the the actions of the executive should be, if not predictable, at least not in contravention of reasonable expectation.

In the case of the previous two Secret Network bridges, SecretSwap began incentives on sSCRT/sXYZ pool where XYZ is the native coin of the bridged network (ETH or BNB so far). Now that the long-awaited XMR bridge is finally active, a decision comes down that sSCRT/sXMR won’t be incentivized. This is not only unexpected but it is in direct contravention to what one would reasonably expect based on the previous bridge roll outs.

The above EC meeting summary by @Ewais001 says only “We have heard plenty of complaints from the community about lack of SEFI pairings, and hope that this will bring it more need and utility.” regarding this decision. No more is said about the decision to incentivize the SEFI pairing instead of the sSCRT pairing. While I have seen some people complain about a lack of SEFI pairings, I also have seen several governance proposals along those lines fail to pass. This includes a SEFI/sETH pairing that would presumably be in the same spirit as the SEFI/sXMR pairing. For these reasons, I believe the EC overstepped its authority in approving incentives to the SEFI/sXMR pairing. This action violates transparency because it contravenes reasonable expectation, is not thoroughly explained, and is indeed a highly non-trivial decision not at all like the clear&decisive, time-sensitive matters suggested by the text of P1, from which the EC derives their authority.

Ok, so it seems my section I has gotten a bit long. I will continue with the second point in a separate post since this seems fairly self-contained so far. I would like to re-state here though that I believe the EC is doing a great job and is striving to do their best, both in process and in substance. If I appear a bit hyper critical I do apologize and sometimes my tone can come off a bit combative; I hope this doesn’t rub anyone the wrong way as I think we all share the same goals here.


In my previous post, I expressed concerns about the approval by the Executive Committee (EC) of incentives for three pools on SecretSwap. There, I argued primarily that these approvals go beyond the ECs mandate. Here I will focus specifically on the SEFI/sXMR pool and I will argue that it is not in the interests of SecretSwap as a platform or its stakeholders (e.g., SEFI holders) to incentivize this pool.

I apologize in advance if the following is overly pedantic but I am trying to clearly and fully explain my thoughts and I want to include the complete context.

What is the basic model of an AMM? The idea is that people “provide liquidity” in that they purchase an ownership stake in the pool (represented by LP tokens) by surrendering quantities in equal value of both tokens in a given pool/pairing. The pool then allows anyone to swap using the provided liquidity provided that they pay a swap fee (0.3% usually). The price is determined by the contents of the pool (through an equation but, briefly, the pool ensures that it doesn’t run out of either token in the pairing by raising the price of whatever token is being swapped out).

This is all well and good but if there isn’t much volume in trades then there won’t be any reason to LP and then there won’t be much liquidity so no way to trade effectively so very little volume – vicious cycle.

To bootstrap our way out of this problem, LP rewards (sometimes called liquidity mining) were devised. That is, LPs will be rewarded not just with the swap fees (which are not appreciable until there is substantial volume) but also with tokens that are newly entering circulation. Now the question of what tokens and how do we get them? The answer is the token that grants governance rights to the swap platform itself. The gov token clearly has at least a speculative value that can be used to incentivize LPs, bootstrapping liquidity to get the system going. The speculative value of gov tokens is due to the implicit power to extract revenue through governance of the platform. Often, this use case goes from implicit to explicit pretty quickly. For example, Sushiswap uses 0.05% of volume (1/6th of swap fees) to buy back SUSHI tokens. This closes the virtuous cycle of value and I am in favor of a SEFI buyback but that is a separate issue.

For the present discussion, we must ask which pools need to be incentivized? Virtually all reputable AMMs (possible exceptions include Curve and Bancor which have different models – Bancor in particular being notably more complicated since technically their gov token is an LP token which is unusual to say the least) have a similar format. This format is to use the native coin as a central currency – incentivizing pools pairing with the native coin. This is the format followed by the most well-known standard-model AMMs including Sushiswap (native ETH, gov SUSHI), Uniswap (native ETH, gov UNI), Pancakeswap (native BNB, gov CAKE), and Spookyswap (native FTM, gov BOO).

At the same time, most AMMs incentivize the pool where the native coin is paired with the platform governance token (e.g., the WETH/SUSHI pool or the sSCRT/SEFI pool). This is to incentivize people to provide exit liquidity for those who will LP to other pools merely for gov token farming. The gov pool is obviously critical since without that, it becomes quite hard to cash out gov tokens and you have low liquidity/interest in the gov token and platform as a whole. After all, LP rewards are payed in gov tokens and liquidity is the source of value here – Liquidity means traders can trade without huge price impact which attracts trading volume which gives implicit value to the gov token (it’s the gov token of a platform with lots of volume so in principle it could charge fees on that volume) and a more valuable gov token further incentivizes LP in a virtuous cycle.

In the case of SecretSwap, this means incentivizing the sSCRT/SEFI pool and then using our native coin (via the wrapped sSCRT) as a central currency for swap pools. Why not use the gov token as a central currency? Well, there are people who have assets and are willing to LP in exchange for rewards but that do not necessarily want exposure to SEFI. These people are called farmers and while they aren’t everybody, they are many and we need them because they have a lot of liquidity. They are a segment of our target market because they are a group of users we want to utilize our platform.

Now, the farmers know for sure that they will receive LP rewards in the gov token (SEFI) and that they plan to sell the rewards to capture the farming yield. Thus, they know there will be some downward pressure on the SEFI price due to farming (themselves and others like them). In the case of a farmer on Etherium, “capturing the yield” means selling the gov token for ETH. Here, it becomes really clear why it wouldn’t be a good idea to use the gov token as a central currency for a swap.

If, say, Sushiswap didn’t incentivize WETH pairings but only SUSHI pairings, then they would have a much harder time attracting liquidity because LPing would carry a much higher risk of Impermanent Loss (IL). In fact, IL would be basically guaranteed once farming gets going. This is why the gov-native pool is always rewarded at a higher rate – because the IL due to gov-token price pressure is foreseen and needs to be compensated (especially early on before volume picks up). This is so much the case that these are sometimes called the “death pool” of the platform in defi degen slang (that is, the WETH/SUSHI pool or the sSCRT/SEFI pool).

All this is especially problematic initially when the AMM is a new platform – they may never get off the ground without any meaningful liquidity. In the case of a farmer on Secret, “capturing value” means selling SEFI for SCRT and then maybe also selling the SCRT for ETH or some other token. The fact that an LP potentially/probably has to trade all the way back to ETH to fully “capture value” from farming only strengthens the argument…If the risk of IL due to pairing with the gov token would suppress interest in LP even when the native coin is ETH, how much more so when the native coin is the relatively lesser known SCRT?

Just to clarify where I am coming from personally, I have like 40x as much value in SCRT and SEFI as in ETH and I don’t dump any LP rewards. I’m hugely bullish on SEFI and want SecretSwap to attract massive liquidity and trading volume. I believe that the way to accomplish that is to make our system user friendly particularly to LPs or at least not less user-friendly than LPs would be used to from other AMMs.

And that’s where this proposal comes in. By approving SEFI/sXMR incentives instead of sSCRT/sXMR, the EC makes the value proposition for a potential LP much less attractive. The prospective LP now has to convert half their stack into the same token that they will be getting as farming reward. This is a substantially worse deal than an LP would ordinarily expect from an AMM. That the EC is doing this to prospective XMR LPs might make it easier for them to swallow because XMR has been locked out of defi for so long.

Full disclosure, I’ve never owned XMR and don’t plan to LP. However, if I were in the XMR community I would feel pretty slighted by this move. As a prospective LP, it would make me feel like SecretSwap was possibly a bit scammy and I’d have to take a deeper look. That’s the same feeling I got when I started looking into Sienna with their whitelisted fund raise, overly memey social media presence, and very little else.

None of this is to knock SecretSwap; a deeper dive would almost certainly allay any fears as we have tons of meat on our bones – an active community engaged in substantive discussions, relentless devs breaking innovative ground, and solid tech with a unique value proposition and nearly limitless use cases. My point is partially just that it feels scammy. Certainly to anyone familiar with other AMMs, understandably to the XMR community if they are singled out, and likely to other prospective LPs as we continue building bridges.

It really feels like this decision was borne out of a desire to support the price of SEFI and, as a sefi holder, I’ve watched the USD value of my holdings whither over the last few months. I can definitely understand the impetus to give some price support to SEFI and ease the pain on us holders/stakers and SCRT/SEFI LPs. But this smacks of short-termism; stepping outside the established practice/principles in search of a quick fix that addresses the immediate problem without considering long-term sustainability.

Finally, I’d say that this issue is (i) non-trivial / not obvious, (ii) subject to differences of opinion, (iii) extremely important for the future of SecretSwap, (iv) liable to generate bad feelings in singled-out communities (XMR) that we want to feel welcomed. For these reasons, I don’t think it is a good candidate for unilateral action by the EC. Any moves toward switching incentives to SEFI pairings from sSCRT pairings should be authorized via governance proposals. The only such proposal so far (to incentivize SEFI/sETH) failed.


Talking about a good read, kudos VVega :slight_smile:

I too am surprised by this move of incentivizing SEFI/sXMR. I’ve always been in favor of using the native currency of the chain as the reserve currency for AMMs. I would prefer to see an sSCRT/sXMR incentivized pool as I believe that will contribute to the long-term success of the swap.


XMR with a market cap of 5 billion $, sXMR community have the opportunity to pull SEFI out of the slumps!

If XMR holders come in as sSCRT-sXMR and they continue the trend like the previous pairs and dump their rewards, how will Sefi survive?

One of your argument mentioned they would have to sell half of their sXMR to acquire SEFI to LP it into Sefi-sXMR!

They can simply buy Scrt and convert into SEFI on its own, matching their input of sXMR for the pool
(just like I had too, sell 50% of my “scrt” to join the sSCRT-Sefi pool)
Sell 50% of their sXMR for Sefi!

By making XMR community go 50:50 into the Sefi-sXMR LP, you are essentially tying up 50% of SEFI & The rewards are either restaked into the LP, cashed out or staked in the Governance Staking Pool!

You are locking up 2 out of 3 options they have!

The carrot is DEFI to sXMR, as they have empty pockets because they can’t leverage anywhere else and keep the privacy!

My vote is to “Not bend the knee” and keep the Sefi-sXMR pool!

If the sXMR community wish to change things, then they need to APE in with governance!


Changing rewards, including pools, is definitely within the mandate of the exec committee, and arguably its most important immediate role.

Other ecosystems like Sushi and Pancake which are significantly bigger agree on incentivization plans in a completely centralized way, so I think having the committee make such decisions strikes the right governance balance.

If we continue to second guess and try to keep everyone happy with every vote/decision, we will never make progress. This is the definition of a deadlock. Even Enigma isn’t always getting its way, but we still respect the process (e.g., with the Cashback reduction).

Re: SEFI/sXMR - there are good viewpoints for both sides. After a long debate, we felt that pushing more value into SEFI likely better represent’s the SEFI holders will.


What if there were two sets of pools? Maybe this could be done in the future.

SEFI - sXMR and sSCRT - sXMR

Both will have X% reward to them in terms of SEFI but the sSCRT - sXMR pool will have 20% of the reward burned so in actuality, they only receive 0.8X% (numbers can be adjusted).

In this manner, liquidity providers that don’t want to be exposed SEFI, which all can agree is a inherently riskier token to pair with than SCRT, can avoid it but are required to forego a portion of their rewards.

It also benefits SEFI holders as if a portion of the reward for SCRT LPers is burned, it reduces the effective max supply of the token.

The question is, do people share the sentiment I have that they would rather provide with SCRT, albeit with slightly lower returns?

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I second the request for 2 pairs sXMR-SEFI and sXMR-SCRT. It gives XMR users the option to choose their risk tolerance and the goal is maximize TVL for the ecosystem, so I dont see harm in adding both pairs.

If the initial idea behind only having the sXMR-SEFI pair was to prioritize SEFI, you can also do by making the weighted rewards different for each pair.

I am not trying to argue for or against the proposed pools. I want to address @VVega 's points about the seeming contradiction between the executive committee charter and how it’s being enacted. I think there is a marketing issue here.

Guy seem to be making arguments against on-chain democratic governance.

This first being, “the democratic process is inconvenient and slow, so we need unilateral decisions”.

The second is an admission that decisions are centralized but excuse it away with a “Everyone else is doing it” or “At least we aren’t as bas as x”.

I believe that the confusion here can be be resolved by pointing out that this project is obviously an oligarchy that takes suggestions, not a democracy. The “on-chain governance” would be better describe as an “anonymous suggestion box for the committee” or a “on-chain sentiment poll”.

There is nothing wrong with this arrangement. But to avoid future criticism or friction, it would be helpful to be make clear to people that Enigma makes the decisions but are open to hear suggestions from the community.


Thank you for your detailed writeup! You have brought up some good points which certainly warrant discussion.

  1. How reliant should the EC be on Governance to act?

Only two proposals have reached quorum. Due to the overload of poorly written proposals, it seems as though our governance engagement is lowered. We’re working on making clear new precedents to necessitate detailed thought and discussion on GOV Proposals, but still, if nothing passes does the EC just not work? What if I ALSO propose “Don’t make a SEFI/sSTABLE pool” and it doesn’t reach quorum? We likely need to find better ways to incentivize governance involvement and voting, and I would love to hear ideas on this, but I don’t think it’s fair to consider votes not reaching quorum as strong votes against. I am certainly open to this argument against our voting to add the SEFI/sUSDC pair and sUSDC(eth)/sUSDC(bsc) pair though. I brought up that this could be conceived as overreaching, but also did agree that it was best for SEFI and the Swap, and voted for them on the basis of trying to better the platform and learning as we go.

  1. Liquidity Issues due to SEFI pairing

You seem concerned that the Monero community, and namely farmers, won’t get involved in LP’ing because of being paired with SEFI. First, there aren’t really farmers in the XMR community. There’s been no way to do it. Does this mean they’re stuck with what we offer? Only until governance changes it. I still recommend a gov proposal to raise rewards, but it could certainly exist to change incentivized pools as well. Also pairing with SEFI WOULD necessitate the price of SEFI go up as people buy it to LP, and as the price of SEFI goes up, so do all of the APY’s on the exchange. If you’re concerned about farmers, you should be MOST concerned with the price of SEFI, as farmers chase high yields.

  1. EC Primarily existing to enact Gov proposals

We have to act far more aggressively and in ways that aren’t clearly enumerated by governance. Approaching exchanges and spending money on listings would all be things that would have to be done without accompanying governance proposals. I hope we continue to be proactive knowing we can change when needed.

  1. The EC needs to do what is expected.

I hope that what is expected of the EC is policies and actions which result in value capture for the SEFI token. You mention that when the other bridges came out, that tokens were paired with sSCRT. There was no EC back then. I understand that many were surprised because it is new, but it is also a new thing that has been strongly demanded by the community for months. We were transparent about it. We discussed, voted, and made the decision public that same day.

I’m sorry that you feel we overreached. I disagree, but am obviously biased and am open to majority opinion. As I understand it, the EC is on a 6 month kind of trial, but I’m sure governance could also end it, change it, or remove/add seats should that be something the community deems important. I don’t take my seat on this committee lightly and will work my hardest to bring value to SEFI and utility to Secret Swap as long as I’m here, but understand that my ideas in how to do that may not always be indicative of the rest of the communities. Likewise however, I think there are many people who are happy that the sXMR pool will be tied to SEFI rather than sSCRT, and that there would’ve been more frustration should we continued with what you believe to be expected. No decision we make will be without scrutiny, but they also won’t be without transparency. Thanks again, I believe the community as a whole is better for having this engagement and discussion take place!


This dilutes the liquidity which makes the pairing harder to use. The slippage would be higher, rewards would be diluted… while it’s a nice thought I don’t believe having two incentivized pools would be pragmatic.

About the burn, I’m obviously a HUGE supporter of a buyback/burn and have been very vocal about it. JUST burning however, does nothing. It only lowers the APY’s. It is specifically the Buyback part of a buyback/burn that derives value for the token by necessitating buy-side pressure based on set metrics, and the burn is just a means of fully retaining that given value. A burn such as you’re suggesting lowers APY’s, doesn’t add buy pressure, and doesn’t continue once the max supply of SEFI is reached.


Thank you for your input Tech, but I disagree that the Executive Committee is an Oligarchy which merely takes suggestions from governance. We HAVE to enact the passed proposals to the best of our abilities. Enigma has 2 of the 5 seats on the committee and does not “make the decisions”. While your suggestion could potentially avoid criticism like this in the future, it is untrue. Furthermore, I don’t think that this criticism should be avoided. Governance enables hard checks and balances which is good for maintaining decentralization. The forum offers the community the opportunity to voice their concerns and grievances in a way that can be heard by those currently representing them.


It seems we agree? If the people are represented by a small group that they did not elect, that is called an oligarchy.

Which proposal are you enacting here?

Again, I’m not against rule by few. This is Enigma’s project. What I am suggesting is honesty in presentation.

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Again, the Exec committee is not Enigma. They have 2 seats on it. By passing governance in proposal #1 the committee was elected representation. Enacting passed proposals to the best of our ability doesn’t mean being nerfed to only doing that.

This was Enigma’s project. Now it is a DAO facilitated and helped by the elected Executive Committee.


I do not care if this project is governed by the community. I would rather it was not marketed as such because it is obviously false. This hurts the credibility of the project.

Enigma holds two seats under the name Enigma. Guy is a principle member of Secret Foundation, so 3 seats. I don’t remember the chain voting for the two other members, so that is an “appointment” not an “election”.

You seem to just be adding validity to my observation that the proposals are a suggestion box for the committee, not a DAO. The committee is free to do what they please even if the proposal fails, and in the case of usdc it did, didn’t it?

If anything is “nerfed”, it is the on-chain governance by the creation of the committee. The same bypass was done to the main secret network chain community fund by the creation of the secret foundation.

Based on his statements in this thread, Guy seems to see community governance as an impediment. It probably is.

Enigma makes the decisions but are open to hear suggestions from the community.

The selling point of the network is the private transaction DEX.

Guy is not a member of the Secret Foundation and holds one of Enigma’s 2 seats.

We were chosen and voted in by the Secret Swap committee in a public meeting.

The on-chain governance created the Committee.

He was listed as a member on the secret foundation website.

So one unelected committee votes people into positions on another committee. Is this what we are calling “on-chain community governance”?

You did not address my point which was

Director — Guy Zyskind, CEO and Cofounder, Enigma MPC — author of Enigma whitepapers with 1400+ academic citations; formerly MIT Media Lab

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My apologies, I was wrong about that.

Just to clarify further. Guy has zero ownership over the Secret Foundation and is merely on a board. Tor legally owns 100% of the secret foundation. Happy to stand corrected if this has changed but I doubt it has changed and this is what I have always been told.