How would delegators or validators be excluded from voting by increasing the commission floor? Normally I consider it a rule to not answer a question with a question, but in this case, I have no idea what you’re getting at.
Delegators can vote so long as they’re staking, regardless of who they’re staking with. If their validator votes, their vote overrides their validator.
Why should we want any delegator/validator excluded from vote?
The great news is that everyone can vote and is not able to be excluded.
As an example, let’s say you delegate to us.
We vote “YES” on a proposal.
You can actually vote “NO” and your voice will be counted as “NO” for your entire delegation.
There’s literally no way to exclude you.
The 0%ers are excluded. If they want to keep their voting power, they need to charge or leave.
That is not what is being discussed, their fee would simply be increased to the set minimum commission.
The only way a delegator loses his voting rights is if they stake with a validator that is outside of the active set. But they don’t earn rewards then either.
What if they decide to leave the community, because they don’t want (or can’t) compete? 1% is nothing, but this is just the start. These things tend to grow. Already in this thread at least 10% is proposed.
We are not elsewhere, we are here. The effects are not immediate, they can show up in years time, but by then it will be too late to correct them. Once control of the chain has been seized, it’s game over. This is but one step closer to losing control.
Correct. But since it has not been discussed from the voting side, it had to be presented. I’m ok to agree to disagree, and I would welcome proof on whatever side it may land.
I’m a bit confused on this, wasn’t it already clarified that all delegators maintain their voting rights regardless of validators?
Meaning, if you as a delegator stake with “ABC Validator” you’re not handing your ability to vote over to ABC. Delegators can always vote on their own, but if they don’t it’ll default to the validator.
Or is there another concern that I’m misinterpreting?
Yes, that is correct. Delegators can vote on their own, and if not, the validator’s vote is right.
The problem is by raising the barrier of entry for new validators, the “old” validators will collect the voting power of the validators that have now been excluded.
Ultimately, I will vote No if this goes on chain, just like I would oppose a ceiling on the minimum-gas-price parameter. Price controls (assuming they are effective) distort the market and create deadweight loss.
I’d rather see any negative externalities associated with 0% nodes (e.g., higher downtime) punished more directly.
Totally respect your decision to vote no on this.
I still would like to bring this up for a vote at least; I think we should raise a signaling proposal.
Bring it on chain & let governance decide.
Plan as it stands is to send it to the validators in the upcoming validator survey to get the details down (what percentage etc) and depending on the results bring it to a signaling proposal after that.
Awesome, looking forward to that. I feel like it’s been a long time coming; I know I’ve brought it up to @Brendan + @dylanschultzie probably 10+ times in the past few months alone.
I’m personally in favor of setting a 5% commission floor on Secret Network as I believe it is the fairest compromise between generating enough income to operate without being overly greedy/taxing to delegators.
I also believe that this is probably more important for Secret Network than it is for other chains, simply because of the higher cost of operation required due to SGX requirements, but also because of how a big chunk of the voting power is controlled by 0% validators.
It is also healthy for the hole set as it levels the playing field for all validators, creates equal opportunities for all from a commission stand point while making it more sustainable. Validators will then be more incentivized to differentiate themselves from each other and attract delegators based on other parameters and contributions than very low commission rate, making it more beneficial for the network.
While we all contribute to the Network & the community in our own way and in accordance with our own capacities, it can be rendered mute/useless, because no matter your degree of contribution, everyday users will just end up delegating to the 0% validators as its the flashiest, most relatable, easier to understand metric users see. Those users are also the majority, as its the minority that is more likely to engage in chats/twitter/community and put the time and efforts needed to study and choose a validator based on more educated/complex parameters.
Have a great day.
Agreed with your points Dylan.
While at this time we won’t be picking whether the floor should be 5% or 10%, my concern is that the expenses of running a relayer should be dealt with separately. Fees being paid directly to relayers, via whatever means is decided, is the direction the entire Cosmos ecosystem seems to be going. Let’s not mix the two. It is not a fair way to compensate relayers (which should begin being compensated, like yesterday)
PS: A commission floor is especially relevant now that Kraken is also starting a Secret Validator.
Raising the floor won’t make Melea or any node running subpar equipment upgrade it, network stability won’t improve because of a floor. You can easily make the argument that people charging X% commission will run whatever is cheapest to maximize their margins.
Melea will run the lowest value available that the floor is set at, and current delegators won’t redelegate to another node because Melea will still be the cheapest option relative to the others. Current Melea delegators won’t redelegate just because there are other nodes at the same rate as them.
The only thing to gain is that some of you will make more money because Melea will stop undercutting you.
There’s no evidence that this will result in bad nodes running better equipment, nor people redelegating away from the cheapest node.
Can we attempt this and revert it in future?
I know this is a relatively uninformed take, but I’ve been reading this thread on and off while I’m doing some assessments, and I keep seeing the point of ‘evidence’ being brought up.
You’re right, either way everything is theoretical - deadweight loss is important to consider, arbitrary price floors, etc.
The other things that aren’t being considered are how is the voting UI encouraging delegation to specific nodes? How do we compare with other chains and what does their UI encourage? How great a % of SCRT holders/stakers pay active attention to governance? What is the statistical impact of the recent airdrop frenzy in terms of people staking SCRT/where they’re staking SCRT - are we looking at skewed numbers as a result?
I think there are too many factors that might skew or impact the numbers for us to make a super definitive decision here, as I think there are compelling cases for both sides. So, is there any way we can enact this for x amount of time with the chain prepped to also potentially revert this commission at a defined point in the future, depending on the results of this… study, lets call it.
If i’ve said anything super egregious or there’s a specific point I’ve misrepresented, I apologise, this is more a conceptual point than a completely correct representation of the nuanced facts. I hope the overall point was communicated sufficiently.